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HOW IS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MADE?
Tracey E. George*
Robert J. Pushaw,Jr.**
CONSTITUTIONAL

PROCESS:

A

SOCIAL

CHOICE

ANALYSIS

OF

SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 420. $65.
Bismarck famously remarked: "Laws are like sausages. It's better
not to see them being made."' This witticism applies with peculiar
force to constitutional law. Judges and commentators examine the
sausage (the Supreme Court's doctrine), but ignore the messy details
of its production.
Maxwell Stearns has demonstrated, with brilliant originality, that
the Court fashions constitutional law through process-based rules of
decision such as outcome voting, stare decisis, and justiciability. Employing "social choice" economic theory, Professor Stearns argues that
the Court, like all multimember decisionmaking bodies, strives to formulate rules that promote both rationality and fairness (p. 4).
Viewed through the lens of social choice, the Court's constitutional
precedent becomes more coherent. Stearns aims to present an account
that is "positive" (i.e., justifies the Court's rules based upon the historical and case evidence) rather than "normative" (i.e., criticizes the
substantive content of those rules) (pp. 6, 63-67). In particular, Steams
logically explains the decisions involving "standing" (i.e., whether a
plaintiff has the right to sue), which legal scholars have uniformly concluded are irreconcilable and thus reflect either intellectual sloppiness
or unstated political motives.
Professor Stearns's thesis is radical, for it compels us to look at
constitutional law in an entirely new way. At the same time, however,
his approach is conservative because it depends on the pre-Realist
premise that constitutional "law" consists of binding legal rules that
the justices try to interpret and apply in a principled way. Unlike many
academics, Stearns "takes the justices' own statements of doctrine, as

* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., B.S. 1989, Southern
Methodist; J.D. 1992, Stanford. - Ed.
** Earl F. Nelson Professor, University of Missouri School of Law; Visiting Professor,
Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A. 1980, LaSalle; J.D. 1988, Yale. - Ed.
1. Otto von Bismarck, quoted in 1,911 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 232 (Robert
Byne ed., 1988).
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expressed in their opinions, quite seriously" (p. 5) and attempts to justify them using social choice analysis.2
Stearns displays a unique ability to convey extremely complex legal, economic, and political ideas in a clear and precise manner. His
work is especially valuable because it is accessible to scholars in a variety of fields, and it will force them to reconsider their analytical
frameworks.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Stearns's book is that he presents
a grand unified theory of the Court's rules of constitutional process
and the resulting development of doctrine. This strength can also be a
weakness, however, because he tends to read precedent and the historical evidence to fit his thesis, even when other explanations might
be more persuasive.
In this Review, we will explore two such alternatives, grounded in
political science and constitutional theory. We hope to show that these
disciplines are at least as effective as economics in illuminating constitutional lawmaking.
I.

POSITIVE THEORIES OF APPELLATE COURT DECISIONMAKING

Positive models of Supreme Court decisionmaking begin with the
rational choice paradigm: that individuals make decisions that they
believe are most likely to lead to their preferred outcomes. Political
scientists who study appellate courts have debated the relevance of a
court's collegial nature to its decisions. Stearns adds to this literature
by focusing on a classical economic theory of collective decisionmaking, Arrow's Theorem.3 He uses Arrow's voting paradox in both its
normative sense (as Arrow originally proposed it) and its positive
sense, as it has been employed by social scientists ever since.4

2. Stearns recognizes that politics and ideology influence adjudication, but contends that
the justices aim to resolve the dispositive case issues in a legally consistent way: "I take doctrine seriously not because I believe that doctrine neutrally drives case results, but rather
because I believe doctrine serves as one of several important constraints that influence the
manner in which justices achieve desired case outcomes." P. 5.
3. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
4. Stearns attempts to distinguish between normative "legitimacy" (i.e., society's acceptance of an outcome because of the fairness of the procedures followed) and normative "justification" (i.e., the merits of a result as compared to foregone alternatives). Pp. 63-67. This
argument fails to persuade within the social choice framework. He uses "normative" in the
first instance in a different sense than it is employed in the second - process rules cannot
produce normatively acceptable outcomes (under social choice theory) unless they are consistent with the goals of decisionmaking considered by Arrow. It may be true that the public
perceives outcomes as legitimate because they were reached by following predetermined
rules. This is a positive account, however, not a normative one. Whether the public should
have this perception is a question that goes to the normative justification for the outcomes.
Stearns's arguments about the rightness of rules that resolve the voting paradox are normative, of course.
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Initially, we consider the central aspect of Arrow's theory of social
choice upon which Stearns relies to create his process model. We then
examine whether existing political science accounts of Court decisions
provide a sounder, more tractable model.
A.

Arrow's Insights into Group Decisionmaking
1.

Introduction

Scholarship built upon Arrow's Theorem (or its descendants) has
traveled'under various banners, including public choice or social
choice theory,5 but shares a heritage in the work of Arrow and Duncan
Black.6 Arrow proved that no collective decisionmaking process could
both satisfy accepted notions of fairness and produce a consistent or
"rational" outcome, that is, one that would meet the requisites for rationality in individual decisionmaking.7 Most notably, he demonstrated
mathematically that aggregating collective preferences according to
democratic methods, such as majority rule, will not always yield a single, transitive collective preference.' As a result, the decisionmaking
process "cycles," moving through a series of options without ever
clearly selecting one. The result is the classic "voting paradox," first

5. The economic theory of group decisionmaking has assumed many labels, including
social choice, public choice, collective choice, or positive political theory. Saul Levmore,
Preface, in MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY xvii, xi (1997). For a discussion of the schizophrenic naming and defining of
the school, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive PoliticalTheory in
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992) (discussing the academic debate over the precise
meaning of the terms "public choice," "social choice," and "positive political theory," which
clearly share "familial" connections).
6. For the classic texts by each author, see ARROW, supra note 3; and DUNCAN BLACK,
THE THEORY OF COMMITrEES AND ELECTIONS (1958). Daniel Farber, a legal scholar who
has written extensively on social choice, observed: "Kenneth Arrow is undoubtedly the paterfamilias of social choice theory .... Arrow's Theorem is the foundation for what is now a
huge body of literature on mechanisms of social choice." Daniel S. Farber, Positive Theory
as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1573 (1995). For a law review discussion of
Black's contribution, see Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and
the Voting Paradox,75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989).
7. Arrow's "General Possibility" or Impossibility Theorem demonstrates that no
method of summing individual preferences can satisfy basic notions of justice and fairness as
reflected in five maxims: universal admissibility of individual preference scales, positive association of individual and social values, independence from irrelevant alternatives, individual sovereignty, and nondictatorship. For an intriguing account of Arrow's recognition of the
voting paradox, see his autobiographical essay in LIVES OF THE LAUREATES: THIRTEEN
NOBEL ECONOMISTS 47-49 (William Breit & Roger W. Spencer eds., 3rd ed. 1995) [hereinafter ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES].
8. ARROW, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SCHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 7-8 (1994) (noting that Arrow's theory "rendered all democratic rules
of collective decision potentially suspect" because they fail to achieve their seeming end:
popular choice).
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recognized by the Marquis de Condorcet in 1785 but largely forgotten
until Arrow revived it.9
Cycling is easy to illustrate. Imagine three individuals, A, B, and C,
who must make a group decision among three options. A ranks her
preferences 1, 2, 3; B ranks his preferences 2, 3, 1; and C ranks her
preferences 3, 1, 2. In a pairwise vote between choices 1 and 2, choice
1 prevails. In a vote between choices 2 and 3, choice 2 prevails. If the
group's preferences were rational, it would prefer choice 1 to 3, that is,
its preferences would be transitive. In a vote between 1 and 3, however, choice 3 prevails.1" If all three individuals vote sincerely in accordance with their preferences, there is no rational means of choosing
one option, and thus there is no "Condorcet winner." No minimumwinning majority can withstand a challenge by the losing participant,
who can always entice one member of the majority to support a different option. For example, if choice 1 prevails, B can persuade C to form
a new majority in favor of choice 3. If choice 3 prevails, A can persuade B to shift to choice 2, and so forth. The majority cycles.
2.

Arrow's Theorem in Legal Scholarship

While many social scientists immediately began to utilize Arrow's
work on collective decisionmaking,1' law professors were not as quick
to appreciate its relevance to their studies. Beginning in the mid-1970s
and picking up speed in the last decade,12 legal scholars have sought to
evaluate law and legal structures by considering how institutional
characteristics influence collective choice.13 Since 1986, more than 100
9. See ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 50 (describing his surprise
at learning, after circulating his own work, that "[tihe paradox of majority voting had indeed
been discovered before - in fact, by the French author the Marquis du Condorcet in
1785!"); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1231 (1988). In
the original book, Arrow credits E.J. Nanson with first recognizing the paradox in 1882.
ARROW, supra note 3, at 3 n.3.
10. The group

members'

preferences

are

"multipeaked".

STEVEN

J. BRAMS,

PARADOXES IN POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NONOBVIOUS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

37-41 (1976) (discussing single-peakedness and multi-peakedness as discovered by Duncan
Black).
11. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES i (2d ed. 1963)
(observing in the preface to the second edition that Social Choice and Individual Values "has
to some extent acquired a life of its own" and thus choosing in the second edition to append
material responding to commentary on the book, rather than rewrite the main text);
ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 51 (describing the voluminous work
built on social choice theory).
12. David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-InfluencedLegal
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659-60 (1997) (book review) ("It was not until the mid1970s that legal scholars first explored the implications of public choice, even though many
of the seminal insights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in place for
over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal literature by storm.").
13. For example, legal scholars have invoked social choice principles to argue that the
legislative process is inherently flawed, thereby justifying greater Supreme Court interven-
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law review articles have included "social choice" or "public choice" in
their titles, and more than 400 articles have cited Arrow's classic text,
Social Choice and Individual Values.14 Within the past decade, law
journals have devoted entire issues to articles on the application of
choice theory to the study of law.15
Frank Easterbrook was the first legal commentator to view the decisionmaking of collegial courts from a social choice perspective. 6
Since then various legal scholars have recognized that multijudge appellate courts may be subject to decisionmaking flaws predicted by social choice theory and have considered the resulting implications for
normative adjudication theories. 7 Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence
Sager, for example, have drawn on Arrow's Theorem to examine
whether the features of collegial courts satisfy the normative goals of
adjudication. 8 David Post and Steven Salop have argued that such
courts should adopt a system of "issue voting" as opposed to "outcome voting" to overcome the voting paradox.' 9 Steams contributes to
this important body of work.

tion. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (drawing in part on public choice ideas to support wide-ranging
judicial activism under the Takings Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, ConstitutionalDeregulation:
Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980) (using interest group analysis to justify more intrusive judicial review of legislation for rationality). Scholars have also
taken the contrary position - that legislatures are as well or better suited than appellate
courts to reach rational decisions. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31
(1991).
14. These findings are based on a search of WESTLAW JLR database.
15. See, e.g., Public Choice Theme Issue, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 709 (1998); Symposium: Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992); Symposium on
Public Choice and the Judiciary, 1990 BYU L. REV. 729; Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997) (an edited reader supplemented with a
discussion of economic concepts relevant to legal decisionmaking).
16. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802,
813-32 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. I. Legal Doctrine,8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992).
18. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court,96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986).
19. David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992). For a thoughtful critique, see John M. Rogers,
"Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts:A Response to Some Radical Proposals,49
VAND. L. REV. 997 (1996) and David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes,
Guidance, and Indeterminancy: A Reply to ProfessorRogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1069 (1996).
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Stearns'sAdaptation of Arrow's Theorem

In previous articles, Stearns demonstrated that he is particularly
adept at articulating and applying the precepts of social choice theory.20 His delineation of the voting paradox in the current book is outstanding and will be a great resource for anyone seeking to understand
Condorcet's and Arrow's ideas (pp. 42-52, 81-94). Stearns creatively
elucidates a number of complicated social choice concepts, making
them both accessible and interesting. Perhaps his best effort is his
modern revision of Shakespeare's tale of King Lear to illustrate the
"empty core" problem.1
The driving force of Stearns's book is his argument that appellate
courts, as collective decisionmaking bodies, are governed by Arrow's
Theorem and therefore are prone to cycling. He presents a group of
Supreme Court procedural doctrines that he maintains can be explained and justified as responses to cycling and related social choice
conundrums. For example, outcome voting, rather than issue voting,
ensures that the Court will reach a decision even when no stable majority of justices can agree both on the means (issue) and the ends
(outcome) in a particular case (pp. 97-111). In instances where only
outcome voting would lead to a decision, the narrowest grounds doctrine offers a fair interpretation of the Court's holding in the case because it limits the ruling to the position that was at least the secondbest choice of a majority of justices (pp. 124-29).
Stearns scrutinizes a handful of cases in order to prove that this social choice account of outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doctrine is an accurate positive theory. His reasoning, however, is primarily normative, not explanatory. Most significantly, he does not prove
that outcome voting developed to respond to cycling problems; in fact,
he does not offer a historical account for its emergence (although it
seems an obvious default rule). Rather, Stearns provides a justification
for keeping the outcome voting rule. The narrowest grounds doctrine
also appears to have been adopted for largely pragmatic reasons:
judges do not know ex ante their relative position in future cases, and
therefore they select a rule that is least likely to be completely contrary to their future decisions. Rational choice theory offers the best

20. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:Justiciabilityand Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
21. Pp. 54-58. Cycling can be seen as one instance of the "empty core" phenomenon. A
bargaining situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core when a participant may be persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger share and such
defection changes the majority agreement.
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explanation for this selection.22 Again, Stearns sets forth a compelling
rationalization for the narrowest grounds doctrine, but not an explanation for it.
Stearns correctly argues that the most important rules of constitutional decisionmaking concern "justiciability" - the fitness of a matter for judicial disposition (pp. 35-38, 157-211). The key doctrine is
standing, which denies federal court access to any plaintiff who cannot
show an "injury in fact" caused by the defendant that is judicially redressable (pp. 37-38, 160-70). Stearns's most original contribution is to
apply his social choice approach to standing (Chapters Five and Six).
He argues that standing is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of
stare decisis. He contends that the rule of stare decisis is similar to the
rule of outcome voting in that both respond to the problem of cycling:
outcome voting addresses cycling within cases, while stare decisis responds to cycling across cases (pp. 158, 170-77).
Stare decisis, however, poses its own social choice dilemma, "path
dependency": parties, particularly organized interests, can manipulate
the development of substantive legal doctrine by presenting cases in a
predetermined order and thereby restrain the Court, which is bound
by its precedent.23 One of Arrow's prerequisites for fair group decisionmaking is that the decision should be independent of the order of
presentation of alternatives. Stare decisis, coupled with sophisticated
litigation strategies, violates this requirement. This conclusion undergirds Stearns's central thesis: that standing doctrine allows the Court
to impede parties' attempts at path manipulation by making it more
difficult to present cases on their merits (p. 159). Specifically, standing
helps ensure that the order in which cases are presented is primarily
determined not by litigant strategy, but by chance events directly injuring plaintiff and beyond her control (pp. 23-24, 157, 159, 162, 17780, 198,204, 208).
As with outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doctrine,
Stearns provides a compelling normative justification for stare decisis
and standing, but his case studies do not persuasively explain the development or utilization of these doctrines. A more appealing, direct
account as to why courts respect precedent is the desire for fairness:
similarly situated parties should be treated alike. Moreover, consistent
decisionmaking is a hallmark of rationality and contributes to a court's
legitimacy. Again, the simple "rational actor" model explains judicial
22. These two doctrines seem to be instances of the strategic theory of judicial behavior
as developed in political science, which we will discuss in the next section. We do not, however, offer a detailed account of its ability to explain outcome voting or the narrowest
grounds rule because that would exceed the scope of this Review.
23. Pp. 177-80. Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund developed this
test case litigation strategy with great success. See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE,
CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT,
COVENANT CASES (1959).

THE NAACP,

AND THE RESTRICTIVE
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behavior. Indeed, the standing doctrine can be explained by a particular rational choice theory developed in political science, as described below.
In our view, Stearns's approach does not function well as a positive
theory because it is not a true model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, in the sense that it is not falsifiable. His theory fails to provide ex
ante for any potential conditions that, if observed, would refute the
model.
4.

Some ConclusionsAbout the Social Choice Theory

Stearns's work on the Supreme Court has been anticipated by social science studies of majority rule institutions, which focus primarily
on legislatures. Social scientists have demonstrated that strict majority
rule in a setting where individuals hold some diversity of viewpoints
generally does not produce a Condorcet winner.14 Thus, cycling is inevitable on a theoretical level when groups make even the simplest
decision among multidimensional options. Nevertheless, cycling does
not appear frequently in practice because most majority rule institutions adopt anticycling procedures or include strategic members who
act in such a way as to offset the cycling problem.' Or, as may be the
case with the Supreme Court, the members hold a limited number of
positions26 and/or are selecting among a smaller or limited range of options.27
24. See Linda Cohen, Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J. ECON.
THEORY 1 (1979); Richard D. McKelvey, General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in
Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979); Norman Schofield, Instability of
Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REV. ECON. STUDIES 575 (1978).
25. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting
Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 49, 69 (1984).
Shepsle and Weingast's study provides an important insight to majority rule with open
agenda setting (i.e., any justice may introduce any alternative at any point in the decisionmaking process): If two options are placed on the agenda where one option encompasses the
other, then the more encompassing option is the sophisticated outcome. Id. at 68-69. A sophisticated voter would propose that alternative in order to capture additional votes.
26. Heterogenity of preferences is a prerequisite to cycling. See, e.g., BRAMS, supra note
10, at 41; Frank DeMeyer & Charles R. Plott, The Probability of a Cyclical Majority, 38
ECONOMETRICA 345, 345 (1970).
27. It is common to imagine judges selecting along a unidimensional decisional space, as
one of us has done in her work. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the
Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). In such a setting, cycling
does not occur because the judges' relative positions are defined in such a way that the majority's preferences are transitive. The literature on majority rule cycles is set in the context
of multidimensional voting space. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 367
(1982). Judicial process scholars have considered the influence of case complexity on the
likelihood of justices circulating separate opinions and noted how their finding - a high
positive relationship - is consistent with Arrow's Theorem regarding the instability of majorities in multidimensional issue areas. FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON
THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 90-91 (2000).
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Stearns obviously has given much thought and energy to the subtleties of social choice theory and the possibilities that arise by applying this theory to Supreme Court decisionmaking. The resulting ideas
are keenly original and innovative.
The social choice approach, however, does less than Stearns claims
for it. He presents his account as a metatheory that both provides a
model of process doctrines and outperforms other models of these
doctrines. Although Stearns comprehensively analyzes all the pertinent decisions, we believe that his theory best explains a group of unusual cases rather than the standard doctrines. Political science provides a stronger, more tractable model of process doctrine generally.
Stearns's theory may supplement that model, but fails to supplant it.
B.

The Insights of PoliticalScience About Collegial Courts

1.

Attitudinal and Strategic Theories of JudicialBehavior

To answer the question of how judges make decisions, political scientists have developed two competing models: attitudinal and strategic. Both models begin with the recognition, that judges are at core
human decisionmakers, and rational choice theory tells us that judges,
like human beings generally, will seek to achieve their goals or preferences. Thus, both political science models build on the same base as
the social choice one: the rational actor.
The attitudinal model posits that a judge seeks to maximize her
sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes".28 This model has been
the dominant positive theory of court behavior because empirical
studies demonstrate that it has substantial explanatory power. 9 Most
adherents of the model will concede that it does not account for all
factors in judicial decisionmaking3 ° and acknowledge that legal rules
and doctrines have been shown to restrain, and in some instances to
guide, adjudication.31 But they point out that the attitudinal model is a
valuable tool for explaining and predicting judicial behavior.
Strategic theorists argue that the attitudinal model can be improved without unnecessarily complicating it or detracting from its
28. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATrTUDINAL MODEL (1993) (offering a detailed delineation and defense of the attitu-

dinal model).
29. See Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1646-55 (1998) (detailing the evolution and status
of the attitudinal model); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 323, 325-26 (1992) (considering the relevance of
legal factors to the attitudinal account). See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 28.
30. In fact, models are inherently incomplete, a simplified and useful construct of reality. A "model" that included every characteristic of the object of study would not be a model
but would rather be the thing itself.
31. See, e.g., George & Epstein, supra note 29.
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predictive ability. 32 Strategic theories of judicial behavior adopt the attitudinalist position that justices seek to achieve policy goals but claim
that justices, in order to accomplish this end, must and do consider the
preferences and likely conduct of'other relevant actors. Hence, strategic theorists emphasize the influence of strategic factors, such as interactions with colleagues on the court (internal dynamics) or reactions
of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the President
(exogenous constraints).33 Such strategic considerations are absent
from Arrow's Theorem. Arrow assumed that preferences were not affected by the decisionmaking process, and he therefore ignored strategic (or game) aspects of the process that would prevent someone from
voting his or her true, or sincere, preference. 34 Relaxing either or both
assumptions - as the strategic theory of judicial process does - will
prevent cycling.
2.

An AttitudinalAccount of Standing Doctrine

A major aspect of Stearns's work is his positive explanation for the
development of the standing doctrine, which assertedly harmonizes
most of the relevant cases and thereby improves on existing theories
(Chapter Six). In our view, however, the attitudinal model provides a
simpler, more intuitive explanation for standing decisions. It can account for the Supreme Court justices' votes on standing by reference
to their preference to favor, or disfavor sociopolitical underdogs. Liberal justices are far more likely than their conservative counterparts to
grant standing to those who are of disadvantaged social or economic
status, such as the poor, ethnic minorities, employees, and criminals.
Conversely, conservative justices are more likely than their liberal
colleagues to confer standing on the powerful.
Consider, for example, the New Deal and Burger Court decisions
that adopted very strict standing requirements. Stearns deems these
cases surprising because of the two Courts' contrasting policy preferences. As we will detail in Part II, the Court created standing in the
32. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Forrest Maltzman & Paul
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerationsand Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 581 (1996).
33. See Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy andJudicial
Choice: New InstitutionalistApproaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making (providing an
articulate primer on, and argument for, strategic theory) in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999).
34. ARROW, supra note 3, at 6-8.
35. Pp. 35-38. One of the problems with Stearns's explanation of the standing decisions
is that the rules he vaunts are merely what the Court allows us to see of its decisionmaking
processes, the great majority of which are entirely secret. It is hard to conceive of these rules,
then, as meaningful constraints on judicial behavior when most of that behavior is veiled and
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1930s and 1940s primarily to deny federal judicial access to businesses
challenging progressive legislation. 6 By contrast, the Burger Court
used standing mainly to foreclose litigation by disadvantaged groups
attacking conservative statutes.3" Nonetheless, the New Deal and
Burger Courts did share an important feature: both wanted to protect
other governmental actors. Access doctrines like standing allow the
Court to deny relief to those seeking to challenge existing political
power arrangements. Thus, the Court's treatment of standing is irretrievably linked to its position on those with access to power in the
first instance.
Moreover, Stearns's process theory is unnecessarily complex. The
attitudinal model explains both the New Deal and the
Burger/Rehnquist Courts' reliance on standing to protect liberal and
conservative legislation, respectively. The attitudinal approach does so
with less complexity than a social choice model. Stearns does not
achieve greater overall success in predicting Court behavior. If a simple paradigm explains the observed events as accurately as a more
complicated and less obvious approach, then the former should be
preferred.3 8 While it is true that human behavior is complex, it need
not be made more so.
Admittedly, Stearns's process model improves upon existing models of judicial behavior by adding to them and creating a more complete theory. Therefore, social choice is not "the" explanation, but
rather is part of several complementary theories (including the attitudinal one) that can account for the observed outcomes. Hence, when
combined, these approaches result .in a multidimensional, fully real-

the part we see is carefully choreographed to ensure the appearance of principled decisionmaking.
36. See infra Section II.B.1.
37. For example, the Burger Court held that plaintiffs must establish a direct relationship between the challenged action and a personal injury and must show that the requested
remedy will redress that injury. This requirement prevented blacks from challenging allegedly discriminatory police practices, see, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and
restrictive zoning ordinances in white neighborhoods, see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), as well as the poor from contesting government welfare procedures, see, e.g., Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
38. Clearly, this is the principle of Occam's Razor. Isaac Newton stated as his first rule
of philosophizing: "That there ought not be admitted any more causes of natural things than
those which are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena." ISAAC NEWTON,
PRINCIPIA: THE SYSTEM OF THE WORLD, reprinted in DANA DENSMORE, NEWTON'S
PRINCIPIA: THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT: TRANSLATION, NOTES, AND EXPANDED PROOFS
241 (1995) (translations and diagrams by William H. Donohue). As Stephen Hawking explains: "It seems better to employ the principle of economy known as Occam's razor and cut
out all the features of the theory which cannot be observed." STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 55 (1988).
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ized model of judicial behavior that no model alone can capture.39 We
will now explore other theories that further enrich our understanding.
II.

A.
1.

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND HISTORY

The Social Choice Approach to Standing
ProfessorStearns's Conception of Standing

Stearns presents a novel theoretical and historical account of
standing. He begins with Steven Winter's definitive history of this doctrine, which posits that the liberal Supreme Court developed standing
to prevent attacks on progressive legislation that began with the New
Deal and continued with the Great Society.4 ° Professor Stearns asks a
penetrating question: Why did the conservative Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, which distrust government regulation, retain and strengthen
standing doctrine instead of abandoning or limiting it (pp. 35-38, 16768)?
He finds the answer in social choice theory: through standing, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to conduct litigation on an
ideological basis, whether liberal or conservative (pp. 159, 162-64, 16870, 198, 204-11). Stearns sees standing as operating on two levels.
First, as noted above, standing improves fairness by reducing the
ability of interest groups to manipulate the evolution of legal doctrine
by controlling the order of case decisions - a "path dependency" that
results from stare decisis (pp. 157-62, 177-80, 190-91, 198, 204, 208-11).
The accidental occurrence of an individualized injury, not lawyerly
calculation, largely determines when a federal court grants access.41
Second, standing promotes separation of powers by minimizing attempts to force judicial creation of positive law where Congress has
remained silent, thereby protecting its power to leave legal issues undecided until a legislative consensus has formed (pp. 158-59, 164-66,
198, 201, 209). Standing thus helps to preserve the fundamental constitutional structural distinction between legislative and judicial lawmaking processes (pp. 159-60, 198-211). Congress has power to create
(or decline to create) law as it sees fit, to aggregate preferences, and to
control the timing and scope of its legislation (pp. 159, 201-02). By
contrast, courts fashion law only on an ad hoc basis when necessary to
decide an actual case, and they are limited to applying legal principles
rather than personal preferences (pp. 201-03).
39. Social scientists have observed that some law and economics scholars mistakenly
believe that they must present a theory that beats other theories and exists instead of those
theories. Such an approach is both unscientific and incomplete.
40. Pp. 35-37, 167. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988).
41. See supra Section I.A.3.

HeinOnline -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1276 2001-2002

May 2002]

How Is ConstitutionalLaw Made?

1277

Stearns characterizes "injury" as a metaphor to describe when fortuitous circumstances have harmed a plaintiff seriously enough to justify shifting the burden of legislative inertia and allowing a court to
formulate positive law (pp. 204-11, 257-59, 262-65, 268-69). Accordingly, standing enables doctrine to evolve more fairly and consistently
with the "majoritarian norm" of democratic lawmaking (p. 300).
Stearns applies this social choice theory to the three main categories of standing cases. First, he endorses the precedent prohibiting
third party standing as promoting fairness and reducing manipulation
(pp. 162-64, 249-50, 259-69). One illustration is the Court's denial to
the Sierra Club of the right to claim that a construction project had
violated federal environmental laws because the Club failed to allege
that its members actually had used the national park that would be
negatively affected by the building.42 Stearns concludes that the Court
correctly held that a park patron, rather than a special interest group,
would be the appropriate plaintiff (pp. 263-66, 277-78). He therefore
rejects the scholarly consensus that Sierra Club invented a pleading
technicality to express the majority's political antipathy towards environmentalists.4 3
Second, Stearns contends that the Court's ban on "generalized
grievances" ensures fairness by forcing the most majoritarian department to deal with illegal government conduct that produces diffuse
harms, rather than allowing ideological litigants to commandeer the
least representative branch to make positive law (pp. 250, 269-71). He
asserts, for example, that the Court properly denied standing to "taxpayers" and "citizens" who claimed that (1) a statute authorizing secret CIA spending violated the Constitution's requirement that
Congress provide a public accounting;" (2) Representatives' simultaneous membership in the military reserves ignored a constitutional
prohibition on such dual service;45 and (3) the government's grant of
property to a religious institution ran afoul of the Establishment

42. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
43. Pp. 263-66. Steams emphasizes that the Sierra Club did not invoke any specific federal statute whose violation had harmed them in a way that conferred standing, but rather
merely claimed to be "adversely affected" by agency action under the catch-all standing provision of the Administrative Procedures Act. Pp. 259, 263-66, 268-69. He contrasts United
States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Procedures,412 U.S. 669 (1973), in which
the plaintiffs relied upon the National Environmental Policy Act, which broadly granted
standing. Pp. 264-66. A denial of standing may have left the statute unenforceable by anyone, whereas in Sierra Club, park users could still have brought suit. Pp. 265-66.
44. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see also id. at 179 (declaring
that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to
the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process").
45. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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Clause.46 Stearns argues that the alleged constitutional violations in
these three cases did not directly harm any particular citizen in a manner substantial enough to warrant a grant of standing and thus an assumption by courts of lawmaking power (pp. 168-69, 269-70). Again,
he questions the prevailing wisdom that these cases simply reflected
hostility toward antiwar activists and strict separationists (pp. 167-69,
233, 269-70).
Third, Stearns characterizes standing's "causation" and "redressability" prongs as shorthand for denying anyone the right to allege
that unlawful government conduct has created a market distortion, the
removal of which will benefit the plaintiff (pp. 250, 271-79). For instance, in Allen v. Wright, 7 the Court conceded that IRS tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools had constitutionally injured
black public school children by diminishing their ability to receive an
integrated education.4" Nonetheless, the majority denied standing because the plaintiffs had not shown that the IRS, as distinguished from
the private schools and their parental supporters, had caused their injury.4 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were making a general
complaint about an executive agency's internal program." Stearns
agrees that citizens should ask the political branches, not the courts, to
eliminate market distortions such as the one created by the IRS exemption (pp. 32-35, 271-77, 279).
2.

A General Critiqueof the Social Choice Approach

Stearns's theory has considerable explanatory power. Nonetheless,
it rests upon two debatable premises.
The first is that the Court applies standing in a relatively apolitical
manner to repel all ideological litigants. If this is true, however, why
did the Warren Court in Flast v. Cohen5 break with ironclad precedent and allow taxpayers to claim that congressional spending for
church-run schools violated the Establishment Clause? Was it not for
the transparent purpose of furthering the Court's liberal agenda of
ending public support for religion? Conversely, didn't the Burger
Court serve conservative political ends (and eviscerate Flast) by rejecting the standing of taxpayers to question the federal government's

46. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
47. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
48. Id. at 756.
49. Id. at 757-59.
50. Id. at 760-61.
.51. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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grant of property to a Christian college?5 2 Similarly, why was the
Court in the 1950s and 1960s so solicitous of minorities, whereas by
the 1970s and 1980s it was denying standing to blacks and Latinos who
alleged unconstitutional discrimination in taxation53 and housing policies?54 Finally, why have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts routinely5
to protect the environment
rejected the standing of those who seek
56
but not those who wish to degrade it?
Although Stearns plausibly answers such questions through complex social choice analysis, most scholars have a simpler explanation
- partisan politics. 7 While conceding the force of such political arguments, Steams astutely points out that they cannot account for several
anomalies in the standing cases or explain why this doctrine has persisted despite the Court's shift from predominantly Democratic to
Republican appointees (pp. 216, 280-81). For instance, crass politics
should have led the "law and order" Burger and Rehnquist Courts to
shut the federal courthouse doors to accused and convicted criminals,
yet the opposite has occurred. The reason, Stearns says, is that criminals are not ideologues trying to manipulate the evolution of legal doctrine, but rather are alleging the most serious kind of individual injury
- that they will be unlawfully imprisoned or executed. 8 In any event,

52. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (summarizing Valley
Forge).
53. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (examining Allen).
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
55. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (invalidating
Congress's grant of standing to "any person" to enforce the Endangered Species Act); infra
notes 70-72 and accompanying text (analyzing Lujan).
56. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (allowing developers to sue a government agency that prevented them from proceeding in order to safeguard endangered
species); Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (conferring standing on homeowners who challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute limiting the liability of nuclear power plants, and upholding this law).
57. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing:A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 635, 659 (1985) ("One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing standing's
agenda with that of the New Right."). Instead of accusing federal courts of consciously engaging in raw politics, attitudinal theorists suggest that judges' political backgrounds influence their decisionmaking in empirically demonstrable ways, regardless of whether they are
aware of this fact.
58. Pp. 163-64, 203-04, 262-63, 273-74. Steams distinguishes those few decisions that
seem to hold to the contrary. For example, he maintains that in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012 (1976), the Court properly declined to permit Gary Gilmore's mother to allege that his
conviction and death penalty were unconstitutional, because the son alone had standing to
raise these claims and thereby force the Court to create constitutional law. Pp. 168, 179, 20507, 209, 250, 256-58, 260, 264. Similarly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983),
the Court would have allowed Lyons to sue for damages resulting from the police department's application of a dangerous "choke hold" to him, but correctly denied him standing to
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he criticizes political explanations as "nonfalsifiable": one cannot
prove or disprove hidden motives that are not expressed in opinions
(pp. 280-81).
But standing decisions do reflect, if not partisan politics, a broader
political theory. Indeed, that theory forms Stearns's second premise:
the Constitution imposes strict standing requirements because our
democracy requires minimal judicial interference with the political
branches. We submit, on the contrary, that standing sabotages the
constitutional will of "We the People," who authorized the federal judiciary to check Congress and the President so that they neither exceed their delegated powers nor violate anyone's constitutional
rights. 9 Before developing this thesis further, however, we will first attempt to refute Stearns's argument that the historical evidence supports his social choice theory of standing.
B.

The History of Standing
1.

The New Deal Era

Stearns's version of events may be summarized as follows. By 1941,
President Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the justices, who
agreed doctrinally on two critical constitutional issues: the validity of
the New Deal and the incorrectness of the substantive due process jurisprudence epitomized in Lochner v. New York' (pp. 220-22, 228-29).
The emerging liberal Court developed standing to foreclose attacks on
progressive legislation in the reactionary lower federal courts, which
would have sustained such challenges and thereby compelled the
Supreme Court to issue substantive constitutional rulings (pp. 36-37,
226-28). These holdings would have differed radically from those of
the preceding era, which had sharply limited the power of Congress
and the states to address social and economic ills (pp. 226-29). Such
wholesale reversals would have exacted a high political cost, exposing
the Court as nakedly partisan and damaging its credibility and perceived impartiality (p. 226).
We are skeptical of Stearns's account of New Deal history for two
reasons. First, from 1937 to 1942, the justices had no qualms about exrequest an injunction (and thereby raise constitutional claims) on behalf of unknown future
choke hold victims. Pp. 168, 204-07, 209, 256, 258, 260.
59. This argument has been fleshed out in Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciabilityand Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) [hereinafter
Pushaw, Justiciabilty].
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Stearns acknowledges that the Court eventually became split on
whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should be interpreted as incorporating the entire Bill of Rights against the states (the Black/Douglas position) or only
those rights that were fundamental (the Frankfurter view). Pp. 229-30. Nonetheless, he
stresses that this division was bipolar, and that therefore the justices could predict the outcome of any particular case. P. 230.
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plicitly rejecting the substantive constitutional decisions of even their
very recent predecessors. 6' For example, the Court repudiated long62
established limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause
and decades of substantive due process cases that had thwarted state
economic legislation.63 The Court paid little political price for this
about-face because the vast majority of Americans (and the political
officials they elected) supported this trend. Moreover, any resulting
institutional costs to the Court (e.g., being perceived as applying political rather than legal principles) seem to have been far less than the
damage to its prestige caused by the intransigence of the conservative
justices in the early 1930s.
Second, Stearns argues that, without standing, the reactionary federal district and appellate judges would have cleverly distinguished the
Supreme Court's new decisions on substantive constitutional law
(pp. 226-28). In particular, they would have struck down progressive
legislation that the Court had not yet specifically considered, thereby
forcing its hand. But we think the justices would have been unwise to
choose standing as the principal tool to discipline lower federal courts.
If these sly Neanderthal judges could distinguish the Court's seemingly
unequivocal substantive holdings, why could they not also manipulate
the Court's new standing doctrine - which was largely discretionary
and very malleable - to grant plaintiffs access and rule on the merits?' Stearns leaves this question unanswered.65

61. Stearns recognizes this phenomenon, pp. 218, 221-26, but not its tendency to undermine his thesis.
62. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing Congress to regulate a
farmer's growth of wheat for personal consumption, despite previous cases holding that
"commerce" did not include production and that Congress could not reach activity that occurred entirely within a state); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(sustaining the National Labor Relations Act by overruling an unbroken line of precedent
which had established that labor was not a matter of interstate commerce). For a detailed
analysis of the New Deal Court's overhaul of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles
to Uphold FederalCommercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85
IOWA L. REV. 1, 79-83 (1999); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the
Narrow Interpretationof the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695,715-16 (2002).
63. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law even though the Court had struck down a virtually identical statute the year
before as a violation of employers' substantive due process right to freedom of contract).
64. Again, Stearns acknowledges the prudential and flexible nature of standing, pp. 4,
30, 161-62, but not its negative implications for his argument.
65. A complete explanation would require an intensive study of lower federal court
cases from that era. Thus, Stearns's claims are not supported by adequate empirical evidence.
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The Warren Court

Almost everyone agrees that the Warren Court relaxed standing to
facilitate implementation of its liberal agenda. 66 First, its activist creation of new constitutional rights would have been hollow without
plaintiffs to enforce them, especially those who had no real remedy in
the political branches (such as minorities and criminal defendants).
Second, the Court sought to effectuate Great Society legislation, allowing Congress to authorize statutory enforcement by plaintiffs who
had suffered generalized harms with no common law antecedent (e.g.,
the right to a clean environment or to live in an integrated community).
Stearns accepts this account, but uses social choice theory to complement it (pp. 231-34). He contends that, because a solid majority on
the Warren Court shared a liberal ideology (with at most bipolar divisions on a few issues), the justices could accurately predict how critical
legal questions would be defined and resolved (p. 232). Again, although social choice provides a fresh perspective, the obvious political
explanation seems to us to be the better one.
3.

The Burger and Rehnquist Courts

Stearns demonstrates that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts split
into three camps: (1) liberal holdovers like Brennan and Marshall,
later joined by Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; (2) conservatives such as Burger, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who would
overrule precedent they deemed incorrect; and (3) pragmatic moderates who were generally committed to precedent (e.g., White, Stewart,
Powell, O'Connor, and Kennedy) (pp. 219-20, 234-38). The justices
could not be sure that, in codifying their preferred legal outcomes in
case decisions, the will of the present majority would be reflected
(pp. 239-44). For instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,67 Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy voted to uphold Roe v. Wade68 on stare decisis grounds, even though their previously expressed position was that
Roe had been wrongly decided (pp. 16-23, 129-30).
According to Stearns, the justices often concluded that because
they could not predict the result, it was better not to risk deciding the
merits (p. 244). Furthermore, as always, the Court could use standing
to foster democratic lawmaking by thwarting ideological litigants who
wanted to create positive law that lacked current legislative support
(pp. 239, 244).

66. The following summary draws on Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 464.
67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Stearns's analysis ingeniously reveals why the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts not only reaffirmed, but actually expanded, the
standing doctrine developed by their liberal forebears. 69 Unfortunately, however, he cannot explain perhaps the most significant
7
standing case of the past half century, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
There the Court struck down a provision of the Endangered Species
Act authorizing "any person" to sue to enjoin federal agencies from
violating that statute.7 1 Justice Scalia maintained that Article III
banned such "generalized grievances" that the government had failed
to comply with the law, and instead limited federal courts to vindicating the rights of individuals.72
Under Stearns's model, however, the Court should have deferred
to Congress's exercise of its legislative power to affirmatively create
law (to protect endangered species) and to determine who best could
enforce that law (private citizens). 73 For the same reason, Stearns cannot justify Bennett v. Spear,74 which granted standing under the same
Endangered Species Act "citizen suit" provision to developers who
claimed economic harm when the government invoked that Act to
halt their project.75 The Court thus has flouted an express statutory directive by denying standing to those attempting to preserve endangered species, yet welcoming entrepreneurs who want to harm such
creatures.
Stearns concedes that Lujan and Bennett undercut his thesis
that the Court takes an apolitical, nonideological approach to standing
in order to preserve Congress's ability to make laws reflecting
majoritarian preferences (pp. 271, 281-93). Despite these and a
few other unruly cases, however, he contends that his social choice
69. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 467, 475-76 (describing the Burger
Court's addition of two Article III requirements, causation and redressability). Social choice
theory also clarifies certain seeming anomalies in the standing cases, such as the conservative
Court's liberal grant of access to criminal defendants. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Social choice analysis here is superior to an attitudinalist or political model, which
would likely predict that conservative justices would restrict the standing of criminals.
Alternatively, however, this jurisprudence might reflect the conservative abhorrence to
government overreaching, which has the most devastating individual consequences in the
criminal area. Thus, the Court may be willing to confer standing generously for the purpose
of monitoring law enforcement officials to guarantee core liberties, although it will give
those officials considerable latitude. Concededly, sensitivity to criminal procedural rights has
not been a hallmark of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
70. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
71. Id. at 558-59, 571-73 (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536).
72. Id. at 573-78.
73. The plaintiffs in Lujan were not trying to persuade the Court to make positive law in
an area where Congress had chosen not to act; rather, they were simply asking the Court to
apply a law that Congress had passed. Id. at 559.
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
75. Id. at 175.
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paradigm makes sense of more precedent than any other approach
(pp. 281, 301). We, on the other hand, believe that one political theory
can explain nearly every standing case.
C. A Competing Model of Standing
The Court has always defended its standing decisions as dictated
by the Constitution's creation of a democracy with a uniquely limited
judiciary.76 This idea traces to Progressive scholars like Woodrow
Wilson, who argued that the American Constitution, with its emphasis
on checks and balances, inhibited the effective governance that modern conditions demanded.77 Instead, these intellectuals championed
the English parliamentary system, which featured a unified legislative/executive "sovereign" (i.e., a plenary lawmaking authority) unencumbered by judicial review of statutes.78
Depression era politicians largely adopted this approach, as
President Roosevelt and Congress worked hand-in-hand to craft the
New Deal, but federal judges often invalidated this legislation.79 Felix
Frankfurter solved this problem by creating - and persuading his
fellow justices to adopt - a standing doctrine that incorporated the
Wilsonian notion that the judiciary should avoid interfering with the
sovereign political branches.8' Justice Frankfurter did not, however,
candidly acknowledge that he was responding to the practical reality
of a vastly expanded federal government that might generate an unmanageable volume of litigation. Rather, he insisted that his approach
implemented the Constitution's text, history, precedent, and political
theory.8 1
Justice Frankfurter asserted that Article III reinforced basic
separation-of-powers principles by restricting standing in federal court
76. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19-26 (1998) (supporting this
proposition by citing numerous standing cases from the Hughes, Stone, Vinson, Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts).
77. See, e.g.,

WOODROW

WILSON,

CONGRESSIONAL

GOVERNMENT

(1885)

and

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908).
78. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 7-11, 34-35, 84-86, 222, 252-61 (1991) (describing this concept of "monistic democracy").
79. Most ominously, the Court struck down the centerpiece of the New Deal, the National Industrial Recovery Act, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935).
80. His seminal opinion is in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460-70 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The full Court definitively embraced Justice Frankfurter's approach
in Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). For a discussion of Frankfurter's singular
influence on modern standing doctrine, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of FederalCourts, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447,452-53 (1994).
81. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Joint AntiFascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,150-60 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to those who could demonstrate an "injury. 8 2 Determining whether a
plaintiff had suffered a cognizable "injury" depended upon the substantive law he invoked.
As to statutes, Justice Frankfurter urged judicial deference to
Congress's judgment about who was "injured."83 Hence, Congress had
sole power to define substantive rights (including novel ones with no
common law analogue) and to decide which persons could vindicate
those rights judicially - government agencies, individuals whose private law rights had been directly invaded by the alleged violation of
the statute, citizens acting as private attorneys general, or some combination.' Conversely, if Congress had not conferred standing in a
particular statute, and the plaintiff instead relied upon the
Administrative Procedure Act's general provision allowing suit by
those "adversely affected" by an agency's action, the Court would
deny standing unless the plaintiff credibly alleged a personal injury of
the sort recognized by property, tort, or contract law.85
Although the foregoing approach comported with the original constitutional design,86 Justice Frankfurter went awry when he extended
his test for implied statutory standing - individualized, common law
injury - to all claims arising under the Constitution.8 7 Such a test (and
a corresponding prohibition on third party standing) might be defensible as applied to those constitutional clauses guaranteeing individual
rights,88 but certainly not to those that either protect collective rights
82. See, e.g., Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also
McGrath,341 U.S. at 149-52, 157-60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83. For an insightful analysis of the evolution of this approach to statutory standing, see
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 36-37 (1978).
84. For example; the Court upheld the Communications Act of 1934, which authorized
citizens to sue to vindicate "the public interest in communications," even if they had no "private rights" at stake. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., for the Court).
85. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also McGrath, 341
U.S. at 152 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This aspect of Justice Frankfurter's analysis incorporated existing precedent. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 13738 (1939). Steams nicely summarizes the Court's new approach to standing. Pp. 227-29.
86. Separation of powers demands that federal courts respect Congress's policy determination about how the legal rights it has created can be enforced most effectively. Thus, for
example, from the beginning of the Republic, Congress has allowed standing to citizens generally to bring various "public actions" to ensure the government's compliance with the law.
See Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 481-83.
87. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (contending that, in
the absence of an express congressional grant of standing, the plaintiff had to show an individualized injury to a private legal interest in order to pursue an action under a federal statute or the Constitution); see also Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460, 464, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (to similar effect).
88. Such an approach promotes liberty by allowing the person whose constitutional
rights have been infringed to decide whether or not to litigate. If at least one potential plaintiff has the ability to enforce a constitutional provision protecting individual rights, that
clause remains viable, and the government will be deterred from violating it. Conversely, the

HeinOnline -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1285 2001-2002

1286

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1265

(such as the Establishment Clause) or structure the government (e.g.,
9
most of Articles I and II).
To say that no one has standing to vindicate these collective or structural provisions, unless perhaps Congress
specifically lets them, turns the Constitution on its head.9"
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter and his current judicial disciples have
failed to grasp that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution shifted
sovereignty from the government to "the People," who delegate certain powers to their representatives in all three government departments.91 Thus, the federal courts' power is coextensive with - not inferior to - that of Congress and the President.92" Similarly, the
Constitution limits all three branches, not just the judiciary.93 Moreover, federal judges are not unrepresentative because they are
unelected. Rather, the People removed judges from the electoral process to ensure their independence in representing the People through
the exercise of judicial power, especially by upholding the
Constitution against transient majoritarian pressures.94 Thus, federal

particularized injury requirement prevents meddlers from asserting the individual constitutional rights of those who choose not to press them. For elaborations of this argument, see
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306-10 (1979); Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at
486.
89. See Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 485-87.
90. The claim that Congress alone can authorize standing to enforce the Constitution
assumes that the political branches have power to preclude judicial review over their own
actions that allegedly violate the Constitution. A central reason that "the People" adopted a
written Constitution establishing an independent judiciary, however, was that the political
branches cannot be trusted to impartially interpret restrictions on their own authority. See
Pushaw, Justiciability,supia note 59, at 485-88.
91. The pathbreaking history on the development and implications of popular sovereignty is GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
259-63, 272-83, 291-343, 362-63, 372-89, 453-63, 530-53, 596-609 (1969). For a discussion of
the influence of Wood and other intellectual historians on constitutional law scholars, see
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "DearJohn" Letters: Advisory Opinions in HistoricalPerspective,87 GEO. L.J. 473, 495-96 (1998).
92. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., CongressionalPower Over FederalCourt Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretationof Article Ill, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 895-96
(agreeing with Akhil Amar that this "coextensiveness principle" was an axiom of Federalist
political thought); see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 397-99, 415-19, 427, 451,
469-72, 478 (arguing that the modern Court's approach to justiciability undermines the coordinate role of the judicial branch).
93. See Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 397-98, 411, 425-27, 467-69, 478, 485.
94. Hamilton made this precise argument in THE FEDERALIST No. 78. He crystallized
an idea that had been evolving over the previous decade, as documented in WOOD, supra
note 91, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 383-89, 453-63, 549; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of FederalCourts and the StructuralConstitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 823,
826-28 (2001) (describing the Federalist precept that independent federal judges represent
the People through adjudication, especially by reviewing constitutional claims); Pushaw,
Justiciability,supra note 59, at 398-99, 411, 420-25, 455, 467-69, 478 (contending that standing
and similar jurisdictional doctrines ignore this principle).
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courts must "interfere" with (i.e., check) the political branches when
they exceed the constitutional powers granted to them by the People.95
In short, the Frankfurter-inspired standing doctrine frustrates
separation of powers by allowing federal courts to abdicate their
role of enforcing the Constitution. For. present purposes, however,
it does not matter whether the political theory underlying standing
is right or wrong. The relevant point is that the Court has consistently
implemented this theory: that judicial review is presumptively
illegitimate because federal courts are peculiarly "limited" in our
separation-of-powers scheme compared to the "democratic" political
branches, and that this presumption can be rebutted only by a plaintiff
who can demonstrate an individualized injury caused by the defendant.
•Indeed, the only major standing case that does not fit this model is
Flast v. Cohen.96 There, the Warren Court permitted taxpayers to
claim that the federal government's support for religious schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though no individual taxpayer
could show an injury distinct from that suffered by all citizens.97 Interestingly, however, the Court did not set forth the new concept of
separation of powers that apparently drove its decision: that aggressive checking of the political branches to protect constitutional rights
(broadly defined) outweighed the, efficiency interest of the political
branches in acting without judicial interference.98 Rather, the Court
purported to do nothing more than follow the established "limited judiciary" rationale of standing..
Consequently, it was easy for the Burger Court to revive the
Frankfurterian notion of English constitutionalism, both in rhetoric
and in reality. Indeed, every Burger Court standing decision reflects
this idea, which was nicely encapsulated in Allen v. Wright:1 ° standing
"define[s] with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of
powers on which the Federal Government is founded," and thus reflects " 'concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of
the courts in a democratic society.' "101
As to constitutional claims, the Burger Court emasculated Flast in
the Valley Forge case, which denied taxpayers standing under the
Establishment Clause because they had alleged a generalized grievance that the government had violated the Constitution, not a per95. See id. at 398-99, 432, 469, 478, 485-89.
96. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
97. Id. at 91-106.
98. See Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 464.
99. See Flast,392 U.S. at 92-95, 97, 101.
100. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
101. Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
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sonal "common law" injury resulting from such unlawful conduct. 10 2
Similarly, in Richardson"°3 and Schlesinger," the Court ruled that no
plaintiff could demonstrate a unique harm flowing from Congress's
violation of Article I's provisions requiring a public accounting of all
expenditures and prohibiting Congressmen from serving at the same
time in the executive branch." By contrast, the Court granted standing to criminal petitioners who alleged that unconstitutional conduct
by law enforcement officials had directly injured them, but1°6not to third
parties who were unaffected by the government's actions.
Turning to statutory standing, the Burger Court followed Justice
Frankfurter's script to the letter. For example, it deferred to
Congress's decision to confer broad standing to vindicate the Fair
Housing Act, which created a novel "right" - a right to live in an integrated community - that had no common law analogue. 17 Conversely, if Congress had not specifically granted such widespread
standing, the justices prudentially declined to infer it. °8
The Rehnquist Court has continued the restrictive approach to
standing to raise constitutional claims."° As to statutory standing, the
Court has sometimes departed from Justice Frankfurter's precise
analysis, but not from his underlying constitutional theory. If, as
Frankfurter asserted, the Constitution requires an individualized injury, then Congress cannot grant broader standing, any more than it
can pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. Under this reasoning, the Court in Lujan properly refused to countenance such an unconstitutional statute, even though its predecessors had mistakenly

102. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ars. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
103. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
104. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
105. Cases like Valley Forge, Richardson,and Schlesinger effectively delete the constitutional clauses at issue. The political branches refuse to obey them, the judiciary declines to
enforce them, and the political remedy of voting is useless because the majority of citizens
do not care if the government violates these constitutional provisions. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 487-89.
106. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
107. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972), the Court
permitted "testers" with no interest in obtaining housing to claim that a company had violated the Fair Housing Act by racially discriminating in conveying information about this
housing. For similar holdings, see Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982);
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977).
108. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
109. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 (1997) (reaffirming the Court's "insist[ence] on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement [i.e., of a particularized personal injury]," which is applied in an "especially rigorous" manner to constitutional attacks on a coordinate federal branch).
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done so out of misguided deference to Congress.1 Conversely,
Bennett v. Spear1 ' correctly found standing because the developers
alleged that they had personally
suffered economic loss - the quintes12
sential common law injury.
In short, the Rehnquist Court has taken Justice Frankfurter's
premises to their logical extreme. The Court believes that it is faithfully adhering to the Constitution's command that the "inferior" and
"limited" federal judiciary must leave the "sovereign" and "democratic" political branches undisturbed, even if they are violating the
law, unless they happen to cause someone a traditional kind of injury.
This theory undergirds nearly every modem standing decision.
III. CONCLUSION
Maxwell Stearns asks that his book be judged on two levels. First,
he declares that his social choice analysis should be deemed a success
if it contributes to our understanding of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process and its implications for the evolution of constitutional doctrine (pp. 216-17). Second, Steams asserts that his model is
better than all the others, in the sense that it explains more data, including anomalies that no other theory can rationalize (pp. 217, 27981).
We are not quite persuaded by this second, bolder claim.
Nonetheless, Stearns has convinced us that any serious constitutional
law scholar must consider his social choice theory in formulating critiques based on doctrine, history, politics, or any other discipline. In
this respect, he has made an original, important, and enduring contribution to the study of constitutional law.

110. If the judiciary's constitutional role is solely to vindicate individual rights, then
Justice Scalia is correct that neither the Constitution nor Congress can force federal courts to
hear general claims that the government has not followed the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992). Again, we are arguing here that the Court has logically
applied a single political theory in its standing cases, not that we agree with this theory. Indeed, the Lujan Court ignored two centuries of American history authorizing public law actions to ensure the government's compliance with the law, which in turn incorporated ancient English practices. See Pushaw, Justiciability,supra note 59, at 483-85.
111. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
112. Id. at 167-68, 176-77.
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